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Are You Sure You’re Saving Enough for
Retirement?
Jonathan Skinner
M any view the soon-to-retire Baby Boomers as woefully unprepared fortheir golden years. Bernheim (1992) suggested this cohort was savingjust one-third of what they needed to retire comfortably. Christine
Weller of the Economic Policy Institute stated that “the average American house-
hold has virtually no chance to reach an adequate retirement savings in the next
50 years” (Dugas, 2002). One recent report declared 43 percent of American
households “at risk” of substantial declines in retirement income, even after fac-
toring in financial and housing wealth (Munnell, Webb, and Delorme, 2006).
Other economists have taken a more sanguine view of American levels of
saving (for example Engen, Gale, and Uccello, 1999). Baby Boomers may not be
accumulating enough, but at least they’re saving more than their parents did
(Sabelhaus and Manchester, 1995; Keister and Deeb-Sossa, 2001). Households
don’t need to save because of reduced expenses as children leave the household
(Scholz and Seshadri, 2006), or because they can rely on programs such as
Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income once they retire (Pauly, 1990; Hub-
bard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995; Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun, 2006).
And many feel that Baby Boomers just don’t need to spend as much once they
retire because of their greater ability to cut back on expenses (Brock, 2004). Aguiar
and Hurst (2005a, b) find that retired households spend less money and engage in
more “home production” such as shopping for lower prices, even while maintain-
ing the quality and quantity of caloric intake through retirement. Finally, if Amer-
icans are failures at saving enough for retirement, why are some retirees so happy?
y Jonathan Skinner is the John French Professor of Economics, Dartmouth College, Hanover,
New Hampshire, and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge,
Massachusetts. His e-mail address is jonathan.skinner@dartmouth.edu.
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As one wrote to the New York Times (as quoted in Loewenstein, Prelec, and Weber,
1999): “You can get by on a lot less when you’re retired, without really depriving
yourself of anything important. . . . If I had known earlier how much ‘wealth’
derives from such simple pleasures, I would have retired a lot sooner.” Indeed,
some financial planners have evolved into “life planners” who encourage clients to
reevaluate their life priorities rather than accept the status quo of meaningless
materialism (Eisenberg, 2006).
This paper attempts to reconcile these widely diverging views of saving ade-
quacy. The seemingly simple question of “Am I saving enough for retirement?” is
apparently not so simple at all. Instead, it touches on a variety of deeper issues in
economics, psychology, and health policy. As a starting point, several observations
seem to hold true. First, wealth requirements necessary to maintain steady con-
sumption through retirement are indeed daunting for many households, even
those with generous 401(k) plans and high incomes. (Readers are warned that
life-cycle retirement wealth targets presented below may lead to feelings of financial
inadequacy.) Most households cannot save enough to guard against all future
contingencies, such as dramatically lower rates of return on investments or unex-
pected earnings losses near planned retirement.
Second, while smoothing consumption through retirement may not be the sine
qua non of retirement planning, it’s not entirely clear what is needed for retirement
security. In theory, prospective retirees know they can always move to smaller
houses or to less-expensive regions of the country, or cook at home rather than eat
out, but how will their future selves feel about calling the moving van or seeking out
less-expensive stores? There is no simple answer to this question because retirement
is such a heterogeneous experience, one that depends on health and temperament
as well as wealth (Kelly, 1958). Still, one can conclude that many newly retired
households both anticipate a modest decline in consumption, and adjust to it.
The final observation is that retirement encompasses both age 66, when
healthy households can easily substitute home cooking for more expensive pre-
pared food, and age 86, when few can substitute home production for purchased
health care. Growth rates for out-of-pocket health care spending have kept pace
with overall health care cost growth, and thus continue to outstrip GDP growth, and
they may accelerate as firms jettison retiree health benefits. These health care cost
projections are perhaps the scariest beast under the bed. Fronstin (2006) estimates
that a 55-year-old couple in 2006, planning to retire at age 65, would need to
accumulate more than $400,000 during the next 10 years in order to afford
supplemental health costs, beyond what Medicare already covers, through age 90.
Even in the near term, projections based on the Health and Retirement Study
suggest that by 2019, nearly one-tenth of elderly retirees will be devoting more than
half of their total income to out-of-pocket health expenses. Thus, saving for
retirement may ultimately be less about the golf condo at Hilton Head and more
about being able to afford a wheelchair lift, private nurses, and a high-quality
nursing home.
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Retirement Saving in a Life-Cycle Model
A good starting point for calculating retirement saving is the standard life-cycle
model in which consumption (adjusted for family size) is flat over the life cycle and
so is “smoothed” through retirement. Thus, households save while working in order
to finance income shortfalls during retirement. Of course, depending on levels of
risk, and on how the rate at which individuals discount future consumption
compares to the after-tax interest rate, a flat path of consumption may not be
optimal, but it is a reasonable first start, and is consistent with observed growth rates
in consumption near retirement (Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg, 2001).
How Much Wealth Do You Need to Smooth Consumption Through Retirement?
The first task of this paper is to calculate how much wealth you should own to
smooth consumption. These calculations are performed only for those aged 40 and
up. Readers in their 20s and 30s should be maximizing their workplace matching
contributions (Benartzi and Thaler, this issue), seeking automatic saving mecha-
nisms such as house mortgages, and hoping that their generation can still look
forward to solvent Social Security and Medicare programs.
I will focus here on nonhousing net worth, under the working assumption that
most households value the option of remaining in one’s house until declining
health forces a move or a sale (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006). To calculate nonhous-
ing net worth, count up 401(k) plan balances, IRAs, business equity, stock invest-
ments, equity in second houses, and so forth, but do not count defined benefit
pension plans that pay a fixed amount at retirement, or prospective Social Security
payments; these will both be included as components in retirement income flows.
Now take the ratio of net nonhousing wealth to before-tax income.
The next step is to calculate the hypothetical target wealth that would allow for
smoothing consumption through retirement. Note that the intertemporal budget
constraint specifies that (a) current nonhousing net wealth plus (b) the present
value of lifetime net earnings, pension flows, and Social Security benefits is equal
to (c) the present value of lifetime nonhousing consumption plus bequests. Ignor-
ing bequests for the moment, the unknown wealth level (a)—that is, the difference
between (c) and (b)—is the level of current wealth that would ensure a consump-
tion path sustainable through retirement as long as the household shall exist. This
target wealth is “The Number”; if current assets are below “The Number,” you’re
not saving enough, or you need to plan for a reduction in consumption at
retirement.1 In a simplified life cycle, just a few parameters are necessary to
calculate this target wealth: 1) current age, expected retirement age, marital status,
and retirement planning horizon; 2) the expected real rate of return or interest
1 “The Number,” the subject of Eisenberg’s (2006) breezy book, is a bit different because it is the
amount of money one needs to retire today to pursue one’s life goals.
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rate; 3) the mortgage payment rate as a fraction of earnings, where the mortgage
is assumed to be paid off by retirement; 4) the saving rate, as a fraction of before-tax
earnings; 5) the retirement “replacement rate” , or the fraction of retirement
annuity flows divided by preretirement earnings.
Retirement annuity flows should include any income from a defined benefit
pension plan, but for many Baby Boomers (and most academics), the only guar-
anteed income transfers will consist of Social Security benefits. These are antici-
pated to pay an annual maximum of $33,390 (in 2006 dollars) in 2031 for an age-65
individual with spousal benefits, or $45,240 if both members of the family contrib-
ute to the 2006 maximum of $94,200. Amounts are more if retirement is deferred,
and could turn out to be less if Social Security is trimmed back under the weight of
its long-term obligations.2 Thus I adopt a final household value of   0.3, which
is consistent with a final working-year income of $120,000 and Social Security
payments of $40,000. (I ignore here the possibility of converting wealth to annuni-
ties, which would allow households to increase  at the expense of current wealth.)
The first row of Table 1 displays asset–income ratios for a set of benchmark
parameters: a replacement ratio  of 30 percent, real interest rate of 3 percent,
retirement at age 65, planning horizon of age 95, 20 percent average and marginal
tax rate, mortgage payments comprising 20 percent of income, and the flow of new
savings equal to 7.5 percent of before-tax earnings. (Relatively few Americans work
until 65, but academics do tend to retire later than the general population.) At age
40, the nonhousing-wealth-to-income ratio is 1.8; it rises to 2.9 at age 50 and peaks
at 5.1 when retirement occurs.
Sensitivity of “The Number”
The first sensitivity analysis, in row 2 of Table 1, shows the importance of
housing wealth in attenuating the need to accumulate nonhousing wealth for
retirement. Renters would need to set aside 8.6 times income by the time they retire
to afford both nonhousing consumption (as above) plus 30 years of future rental
payments. Thus paying off the mortgage by retirement reduces nonhousing wealth
requirements substantially.
Target wealth is also sensitive to changes in the saving rate; the wealth–
income ratio at age 40 is – 0.5 when the saving rate is 15 percent, and 3.1 when
the saving rate is 2.5 percent (rows 3 and 4). One puzzle is why wealth
requirements at retirement are so much larger for the household saving
2.5 percent (5.8 times income) instead of 15 percent (3.8 times income.) The
resolution is to note that the high saving household has gotten used to lower rates
of consumption while working, so less is needed to smooth consumption through
retirement. Raising saving rates therefore yields a “double dividend” in life-cycle
2 An alternative approach is to take current wealth as given and calculate necessary replacement rates,
with more elaborate models accounting for sources of investment, longevity, or health risk (VanDerhei,
2006).
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saving by stimulating asset accumulation and attenuating future required consump-
tion.
Extending retirement age to 70 (row 5), not uncommon among academics,
sharply reduces required wealth accumulation at all ages, while retiring early at 60
(row 6) raises wealth accumulation. As row 7 demonstrates, dying early is another
approach to ensuring retirement security. A scenario that might be plausible for a
lower-income worker who doesn’t own a house—a replacement ratio of   0.6, a
retirement age of 62, and a saving rate of 5 percent—yields a wealth/income target
of 1.8 at age 40, rising to 4.2 at retirement (row 8). Finally, allowing earnings to
grow in real terms at 2 percent, coupled with consumption growth of 2 percent
until retirement, leads to even larger wealth requirements relative to the bench-
mark, since consumption growth also raises the level of retirement consumption
(row 9).
Figure 1 demonstrates the sensitivity of retirement savings to two important
factors: the income replacement ratio  and the interest rate. The target retirement
wealth ratio is graphed for different values of the replacement rate  (0.2, 0.4, and
0.6) and the interest rate. Note that the wealth target is not particularly sensitive to
the interest rate when   0.6. When the household saves 7.5 percent of earnings,
pays a mortgage of 20 percent of earnings, and pays income taxes, what’s left over
for consumption is sufficiently small to be taken care of by retirement income flows.
Thus high replacement rates help to insure against the risk of interest rate fluctu-
ations. By contrast, when saving requirements are much greater, as in the case
Table 1














1 Simple life-cycle benchmark 1.8 2.3 2.9 3.6 4.3 5.1
2 Nonhomeowner 3.7 4.5 5.2 6.0 7.8 8.6
3 Higher saving rate (15%) 0.5 0.3 1.1 1.9 2.8 3.8
4 Lower saving rate (2.5%) 3.1 3.6 4.1 4.6 5.2 5.8
5 Late retirement (age 70) 0.9 1.4 1.9 2.5 3.1 4.5
6 Early retirement (age 60) 2.7 3.3 4.0 4.7 5.5 5.5
7 Early death (age 85) 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.6 3.2 3.9
8 Replacement rate   0.6, retired at 62,
5% saving rate, nonhomeowner
1.8 2.3 2.7 3.3 3.9 4.2
9 Earnings and consumption growth of 2%
until retirement
3.2 3.6 4.0 4.4 4.7 5.1
10 Consumption decline at retirement
(by 20%)
0.6 1.1 1.6 2.1 2.7 3.4
Notes: Wealth-to-income ratios necessary to ensure smooth consumption through the household’s
lifetime. Baseline life-cycle simulation parameters: 3 percent real interest rate; no growth in earnings;
retirement planning horizon of 95; retirement age of 65; 7.5 percent saving rate; 20 percent mortgage
payment; and 20 percent marginal and average tax rate.
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where   .2, “The Number” is highly sensitive to adverse outcomes in equity and
bond markets. It ranges from below one (that is, wealth less than current income)
for a 10 percent rate of return, to 8.0 for a laggard 1 percent return.3
This model ignores many factors potentially relevant to retirement planning,
such as tax-deferred accounts (where balances are typically pretax dollars before
being distributed from the account), the progressivity of the tax code, children’s
expenses (including college or bail bonds), mortgage payments, estate planning,
and a variety of other factors. To handle this additional complexity, I turn to
ESPlanner, a commercial retirement planning program built on the same life-cycle
framework simulated in Table 1, but with all these other factors relevant for saving
plans built in.4 I use several representative income levels based on the 2005 annual
3 This model assumes a steady state with constant real interest rates. Were interest rates to fluctuate, the
calculations would be affected by simultaneous changes in the market value of assets held by the
household.
4 It was programmed originally by Jagdeesh Gohkale and Laurence Kotlikoff. Kotlikoff (2006) argues
persuasively that this model provides better financial advice than popular alternatives. In the program,
I determined target wealth iteratively to within a tolerance of under $50 between actual and recom-
mended consumption.
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Note: This graph shows how changes in assumptions about future real interest rates affect target wealth
values to ensure consumption smoothing, evaluated at age 50. The model is as described in the notes
to Table 1. The association between the interest rate and wealth–income ratios are shown for different
replacement rates of retirement income relative to preretirement income:   0.2 (20 percent of pretax
income), 0.4, and 0.6.
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American Economic Association survey of economics departments, kindly supplied
by John Siegfried (Vanderbilt University, Tennessee) and Charles Scott (Loyola
College, Maryland).
The income distribution is based on median earnings at schools (not individ-
uals), but the percentiles are weighted by the number of faculty at each institution.
I begin with what is a relatively low baseline academic-year income for full profes-
sors, $68,000, at the 10th percentile (from the bottom) of B.A.-granting colleges.
This rises to $88,000 for the median and $126,000 at the 95th percentile. By
contrast, the 10th percentile salary for full professors at Ph.D.-granting institutions
is $104,000, the median $134,000, and the 95th percentile $184,000. To span these
ranges, I adopt multiples of $68,000, reaching as high as $272,000 to capture the
hypothetical income of very well-compensated dual working households (or a
part-time finance professor). These calculations cannot be generalized to the
wealth requirements of low-income households whose saving needs may be more
modest owing to more generous replacement rates in Social Security or from Social
Security Disability Insurance (Bernheim, Berstein, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff, 2000,
although see VanDerhei, 2006).
Table 2 provides these target wealth holdings by age for single and married
households for a variety of income and demographic scenarios. The detailed inputs
are described in the notes to Table 2; the surprising feature is how important all of
these additional variables are for retirement planning. The house is assumed to be
worth 2.5 times income, and the mortgage balance, with 20 years remaining, is
initially equal to twice income. The equivalence scale of a spouse is assumed to
augment consumption by 0.6, while each child increases the consumption require-
ments of the household by .25.5 I assume a baseline saving rate equal to 7.5 percent
of pretax income, with 5 percent to a 401(k) and 2.5 percent to nonretirement
assets, split equally between bonds and stocks. This is a flow measure, and under-
estimates the real saving rate, which includes capital gains, the reinvestment of
interest and dividend income, and any appreciation in housing equity. An impor-
tant assumption implicit in this model is that once the house mortgage is paid off,
monthly payments are diverted to saving, not consumption.
Consider the simplest case, of a single person with income of $68,000 and
whose contingency planning allows for a 95-year lifespan. As in the previous
analysis, I focus solely on nonhousing wealth. The first row in Table 2 shows that
wealth at age 40 necessary to sustain a constant consumption flow is just $14,000. By
retirement, nonhousing wealth has grown to $272,000, somewhat below the pre-
scribed wealth-to-income ratio in Table 1. For households with children (row 2),
target wealth levels in a household with $68,000 in income are higher during their
40s in anticipation of college expenses. For single households earning $136,000
5 The total equivalence scale for two adults and two children in this model, 2.1, matches the OECD-
modified equivalence scale (although they place slightly more weight on children and less on adults);
for a very succinct introduction, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2005).
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annually (row 3), wealth requirements are substantially greater, $964,000 at retire-
ment, because the progressivity of Social Security payments leads to a lower
replacement rate . Home ownership reduces target wealth (row 4 versus row 3)
because the homeowner need not save against future rental payments during
retirement (as in the example above), and because of the extra saving gained by
paying off the mortgage at age 60.
For married households with two children and income of $136,000, saving
requirements are $167,000 at age 40, rising to $850,000 prior to retirement (row 5).
In the presence of a defined benefit plan that pays 30 percent of before-tax income,
Table 2
Target Measures of Nonhousing Wealth Using ESPlanner
(in thousands of dollars)













1 Single, $68,000, house 14 46 86 136 201 272
2 Married, $68,000, house, two children 39 78 84 99 156 221
3 Single, $136,000, house 282 382 501 637 804 964
4 Single, $136,000, no house 580 719 871 1,040 1,226 1,357
5 Married, $136,000, house, two children 167 315 399 506 693 850
6 Married, $136,000, house, two
children, defined benefit plan
40 67 32 3 30 95
7 Single, $204,000, house 702 897 1,125 1,385 1,694 1,972
8 Married, $204,000 house, two children 118 219 291 416 669 924
9 Married, $204,000 house, two children,
1% return
430 532 594 704 925 1,120
10 Married, $272,000 house, two children 316 469 590 807 1,170 1,533
11 Single, $136,000, house, two children
(0.7 equivalent)
18 78 101 200 394 585
12 Married, $204,000, two children,
nursing home expenses
477 633 764 955 1,282 1,609
13 Married, $204,000, two children,
nursing home expenses, 15% saving
138 320 481 699 1,059 1,427
Notes. All calculations performed using ESPlanner. Baseline parameter values: Inflation rate 3 percent;
nominal return 6 percent; saving rate 5 percent in a 401(k), 2.5 percent in non-tax-preferred assets (split
evenly between money market and stocks); house value is 2.5 times household income; mortgage
balance is 2.0 times household income; property tax rate is 0.68 times house value (Ladd and Bradbury,
1988); mortgage payments for 20-year loan at 6.5 percent ($632 per month per $100,000 mortgage). For
defined benefit plan, payments are 30 percent of final-year income. The home mortgage is assumed paid
off by age 60. Two children are ages 8 and 10 when adult is age 40; equivalence scales for children are
0.25 (as in Attanasio, Banks, Meghir, and Weber, 1999); $20,000 per year of college expenses in 2006
dollars for incomes of $136,000 or more, $10,000 per year for the $68,000 income household. In the
medical expenses scenario, there are tax-deductible out-of-pocket expenditures for a nursing home stay
for the last 5 years of spouse’s life. These are assumed to be $40,000 annually (in 2006) but in each year
such costs rise at a 3% real annual rate, so that by 2056 they are $175,000 for each of the five years. The
household is assumed to reside in Pennsylvania for state tax purposes. Single scenario: Single, life
expectancy of 95. Married scenario: Equivalence scale of 0.6 for spouse; life expectancy of male is 85; life
expectancy of female is 95; $250,000 is held in a term life insurance policy.
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however, wealth requirements drop substantially, with prescribed wealth of only
$95,000 at age 65 (row 6). This is because combined Social Security and pension
payments match the consumption of the empty-nest couple (and the surviving
spouse) quite closely. As one moves up the income distribution (rows 7–10), target
wealth measures rise accordingly, but the wealth-to-income ratio for these higher
income groups is actually a bit lower; for example, the wealth-to-income at retire-
ment for the household earning $136,000 (row 5) is 6.2, but is only 5.6 for the
household earning $272,000 (row 10). This pattern largely reflects the progressivity
in the tax code leading to less-than-proportional increases in lifetime consumption
streams.
A comparison of rows 8 and 9 suggests a somewhat smaller interest elasticity of
target wealth than that suggested by the earlier simulations, in part because the
discount rate is less important for college expenses, and also because of declining
total expenditures as first children, and then a spouse, leave the household. Table
2 also demonstrate that the presence of children, with equivalent scale measures of
0.7, actually reduces required wealth accumulation (row 11 compared to row 3), and
that wealth requirements necessary to plan for a future in which the spouse spends
five years in a nursing home are indeed daunting (row 12 compared to row 8).
These topics are taken up in more detail below.
How Much Money Do You Really Need to Enjoy Retirement?
As noted above, a variety of studies show that most American households fail
to meet saving goals suggested by certainty life-cycle models (Ameriks and Utkus,
2006; Warshawsky and Ameriks, 2000; Shackleton, 2003; Munnell, Webb, and
Delorme, 2006; Mitchell and Moore, 1998; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006). Figure 2
shows that even Baby Boomers aged 51–55 with postgraduate degrees fall short of
the conventional savings targets calculated above; the median nonhousing-wealth-
to-income ratio is 1.7, with the 25th percentile just 0.5 (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006).
Many well-educated Baby Boomers will likely need to scale back consumption at
retirement. But does this mean that they’ve failed to save “enough”? Here I
consider several explanations for why consuming less at retirement might not
imperil retirement security.
Housing Equity Can Be Used to Finance Consumption during Retirement
Some financial planners have noted how much retirees could save simply by
unleashing their housing equity and moving to towns such as Henderson, Nevada,
where living costs are less than half that in New York (Brock, 2004, p. 74).6 A more
limited approach would be to purchase a smaller house or condominium in the
6 Of course, this strategy begs the question of why housing costs are so low in Henderson, Nevada.
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same town. If one is planning to downsize in the future, it’s okay to add some part
of housing equity to the retirement nest-egg available for nonhousing consump-
tion—but the value should be discounted, perhaps at a risky rate of return. In
practice, Venti and Wise (1989) have shown that recent retirees are about as likely
to move into more-expensive as less-expensive housing. The exception occurs when
there are adverse transitions such as widowhood or serious illness, at which point
households are more likely to tap into housing equity (Venti and Wise, 2004). Thus,
average housing equity tends to decline with age, particularly among older house-
holds (Hurd, 2003).
Still, future retirees are typically unwilling to commit to having to move to a
smaller house. Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) found nearly 70 percent of respondents
to the Health and Retirement Survey aged 70 and under felt there was a minimal
(10 percent or less) chance of selling their house to pay for retirement (see also
Smeeding, Torrey, Fisher, Johnson, and Marchand, 2006). Reverse mortgages allow
retirees to borrow money against housing equity, to be repaid upon death; however,
their use has not been widespread (Sun, Triest, and Webb, 2006).
A middle ground recognizes the option value of housing equity for future
uncertain contingencies. Housing equity is perhaps the best hedge against future
catastrophic health care costs, because such equity is often exempted from Medi-
caid asset limits, and because patients with expensive chronic illnesses who require
specialized health care would need to vacate their house in any case (Skinner,
Figure 2


























Net wealth less house equity
Source: Calculations by Annamaria Lusardi based on the 2004 Health and Retirement Study (HRS)
sample as defined in Lusardi and Mitchell (2006).
Notes: The bars show median wealth-to-income ratio by income category, and the brackets denote the
interquartile range (25th to 75th percentile distribution). N  2631. HS is “high school.”
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2004). Even if these adverse events don’t occur, home equity can still provide a
bequest to children or to other worthy causes (Dynan, Skinner, Zeldes, 2002).
With Children Gone (Or a Spouse Lost), Consumption Expenses Are Lower
During Retirement
Any parent will bemoan the expenses of raising children, ranging from diapers
early in the life cycle to college education and helping out with housing down-
payments later. For this reason, parents may reasonably expect a decline in family
expenses as the children depart. The importance of children in life-cycle consump-
tion and saving was emphasized by Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) and
Scholz and Seshadri (2006), who found 80 percent of U.S. households were
optimally saving for retirement after accounting for the timing and influence of
children on optimal consumption plans. Equivalence scales were used to adjust
household consumption for differences in the size and composition of the house-
hold. Their equivalence scale, from Citro and Michael (1995), implied that a
married couple with two children now consuming $40,000 can smooth person-
equivalent consumption by planning for $24,600 in expenditures once the children
have left, and for $17,000 following the departure of a spouse.7
The importance of equivalence scales can also be seen in ESPlanner by
comparing row 11 in Table 2 (a single parent with two children) against row 4 (a
single person without children). (In row 11, the ESPlanner default equivalence
scale of 0.7 per child is used.) Target wealth at age 40 is $18,000 for the household
with children, and $282,000 for the household without! Despite the additional
expense of college, retirement saving is diminished for the parent with children
because her annual consumption at retirement is just $49,301, rather than the
$63,445 required for the single household.
In other words, parents are already used to getting by on peanut butter, given
that a large fraction of their preretirement budget has been devoted to supporting
children, so it’s not difficult to set aside enough money to keep them in peanut
butter through retirement. By contrast, childless households with the same income
accustomed to caviar and fine wine must set aside more assets to maintain them-
selves in the style to which they have become accustomed. This assumption is
central to why the Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) and Scholz and
Seshadri (2006) studies and Kotlikoff’s own studies using ESPlanner show that
many households are saving too much for retirement (Darlin, 2007). In practice,
whether parents should plan to continue consuming just peanut butter is not
entirely clear, particularly if they want to substitute into more consumption for
themselves. And even a peanut butter diet might not be sufficient if they value
strategic bequests and the warm glow from inter vivos transfers.
7 The classic study of how demographic factors affect life-cycle consumption is Attanasio, Banks, Meghir,
and Weber (1999), who find more modest effects of children and spouses on consumption.
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There Are Ample Opportunities to Economize While Retired
It is reasonable to believe that households need not spend as much during
retirement, given the sudden increase in available time.8 In this view, retirement is
an opportunity to substitute leisure, or home production, for market expenditures,
given that the “price” of labor inputs into the household production (or the
reservation wage) has just fallen (Ghez and Becker, 1975). For example, retirees
now have more time to cook spaghetti sauce at home rather than buy prepackaged
sauce, or shop for lower-cost but equally nutritious food. And it is certainly true that
if households can plan on a decline of (say) 20 percent at retirement, their target
wealth while younger declines substantially, from a wealth–income ratio of 2.3 to
only 1.1 at age 45 (Table 1, row 10).
Consider an economic model in which leisure (inclusive of home production)
and consumption expenditures are combined to create contemporaneous utility Z.
For those who retire voluntarily, Z will rise simply because the “shadow” wage rate,
or the implicit cost of time spent in home production, has declined, leading to a
jump in hours spent at home. This can be shown in Figure 3, where the contem-
poraneous utility Z jumps up discontinuously at retirement. It is straightforward to
show in a constant-elasticity-of-substitution utility function that consumption
smoothing is optimal only when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of Z—or
the ease of substituting utility from one time period to the next—is equal to the
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure.9
Intuition might suggest that optimal consumption expenditures should drop
discretely at retirement, as is shown in Figure 3. However, this result holds only
when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of Z is less than the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure—meaning that house-
holds can more easily substitute leisure for consumption than shift household
production of utility (or Z) to later in life. Conversely, when the intratemporal
elasticity is less than the intertemporal elasticity, optimal consumption is predicted
to rise at retirement, meaning that households would save more so they could
really enjoy themselves during their retirement years.
There is mixed evidence on the relative magnitude of these elasticities; some
imply a rise in optimal consumption at retirement (for example, Ziliak and
Kniesner, 2005), while others imply a decline. Aguiar and Hurst (2005a) find that
recently retired households are remarkably efficient in home production, saving
8 It might appear that retiring from a job frees up expenditures on commuting, work-related clothing,
and other expenses associated with employment. However, work-related expenses do not appear to
account for much of the consumption decline (Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg, 2001).
9 The intratemporal elasticity is related closely to the labor supply elasticity. In standard notation,
lifetime utility U  (1-1/)-1 ¥t Zt
1-1/ (1)1-t and Zt  (Ct
1-1/ Lt
1-1/)[1/(1-1/)] with C and L
denoting consumption and leisure,  the time preference rate,  the intratemporal elasticity of
substitution between consumption and leisure,  the intertemporal elasticity of substitution across the
household production of utility (Z), and  measuring the relative taste for leisure. Alternatively,
smoothing holds when consumption and leisure are strongly separable.
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large amounts in their market expenditures while maintaining both the quality and
quantity of food. Similarly, Aguiar and Hurst (2005b) find that in a cross-section of
shoppers in Denver, prices paid for identical supermarket items varied systemati-
cally across demographic groups, with higher-income and middle-aged people
paying more, and younger and older households less.
Distinguishing between consumption and home production of utility can
potentially resolve a puzzle in the data; 73 percent of retirees wished they had saved
more (Hurd and Zissimopoulos, 2003), yet the majority of voluntary retirees are as
happy or happier being retired (Loewenstein, Prelec, and Weber, 1999; Charles,
2002; Bender, 2004). These retirees may not have saved enough for the retirement
they thought they wanted, but the additional leisure cannot help but to raise their
utility and create good cheer. The story is different when retirement is involuntary
because of job separation or poor health, which occurs for 37 percent of the Health
and Retirement Study (Bender, 2004). For this group, subjective well-being
declines (Charles, 2002), a decline that could also reflect a much diminished
household production function.
There is a remarkable heterogeneity in the saving adequacy of households,
even in academic settings (Bernheim, Berstein, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff, 2002).
Perhaps 20 percent of households arrive at retirement with generous replacement
rates  and asset-to-income ratios, and these households do smooth consumption
or even increase consumption by a small amount. These households also spend
Figure 3






























Note: Utility Z is a function of consumption and leisure. Because leisure rises so much at retirement Z
jumps up despite the decline in market expenditures or “consumption.” Note that for other parameters
of the household production function, consumption may actually rise optimally at retirement.
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more time cooking and shopping (Schwerdt, 2005). But for the one-third of the
population with inadequate replacement rates and wealth accumulation, consump-
tion declines by 20 percent or more, because of the unrelenting discipline of the
budget constraint (Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg, 2001). Households largely
anticipate the decline (Hurd and Rohwedder, 2006), with the exception of those
who didn’t plan well for retirement, where nearly one-quarter are surprised by how
high their expenses are at retirement (Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy, forthcoming).
What we don’t know is whether this heterogeneity in wealth accumulation at
retirement reflects natural variation in the household production function (some
are better at making spaghetti sauce than others) or heterogeneity in psychological
biases towards saving (Bernheim and Rangel, 2005).10
Evidence that favors psychological explanations for variations in wealth accu-
mulation come from the literature on 401(k) plan participation, in which simple
changes in program participation default rules, so that workers must opt out of a
401(k) rather than opt in, had a dramatic impact on participation rates (Madrian
and Shea, 2001; Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2004). In this issue, Benartzi
and Thaler discuss this default rule as well as other default rules involving issues
such as the level of contributions to a retirement savings account over time and how
those savings are invested. Similarly, Lusardi (1999) and Ameriks, Caplin, and
Leahy (2003) suggest that simply planning for retirement encourages greater
savings, while Lusardi and Mitchell (2006) find that financial literacy—whether
households understand compound interest—is also associated with higher levels of
wealth. From this perspective, the lack of wealth at retirement for many Americans
may not be the consequence of well-formed preferences, but instead of procrasti-
nation or inertia.
However, behavioral models cut both ways in terms of whether retirees will be
happy with the savings choices they made earlier in life, because these models also
have demonstrated that people have the ability to adapt to new circumstances. For
example, paraplegics report happiness levels that are not so far from lottery winners
(Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman, 1978). By comparison, learning to live with
a 20 percent decline in consumption at age 66 shouldn’t be too difficult, particu-
larly for those in comfortable economic circumstances. If households are able to
replicate the same nutritional consumption flow postretirement with relatively little
effort, as in Aguiar and Hurst (2005a), it could even prompt households to wonder
why they hadn’t economized on expensive food expenditures years before.
Some retirement planners go one step further, taking on the role of life-cycle
therapist and trying to understand what makes Baby Boomers happy. As Eisenberg
(2006, p. 251) gently admonishes, “[Y]ou’re simply trapping yourself in a never
ending cycle of acquisition and you haven’t even taken a stab at figuring out what
10 Another possibility is variation in time-preference rates. However, Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg
(2001) found no evidence that consumption growth rates differed across these groups prior to
retirement, when households should be least likely to encounter liquidity constraints.
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it would cost to do what you really want.” In other words, why work until age 65 to
maintain a $150,000 per year consumption habit if by retiring early, one can live a
fulfilling life on “only” $100,000 annually? Recognizing that money may not buy
happiness, Eisenberg suggests instead that retirement may be better spent in
early-morning meditation, spending a few hours writing “the great American
novel,” and then volunteering at a community center. But when the client becomes
too sick or frail to write a novel and needs volunteers to visit her—then what?
The Real Worry: Growing Out-of-Pocket Health Care Costs
Models of retirement planning with perfect certainty are likely to understate
the risks from poor health. First, there are risks to future income and wealth from
poor health prior to retirement. In a 10-year period, seven out of ten adults aged
51–61 developed health problems, lost their jobs, or lost spouses owing to divorce
or death (Johnson, Mermin, and Uccello, 2006; also see Smith, 2005). Most of these
shocks had a sharp adverse impact on wealth: among couples, a new medical
condition caused a 17 percent decline in wealth for couples, work disability caused
a 16 percent decline, and divorce a 44 percent decline, presumably the conse-
quence of uninsured legal fees and other contingencies (Johnson, Mermin, and
Uccello, 2006). Typically, complex dynamic programming models call for higher
levels of precautionary saving to guard against such risks.
Once retired, health care is a commodity where opportunities for substitution
between leisure and market expenditures are limited. Poor health both restricts the
ability of elderly people to engage in home production (for example, if they can no
longer drive around to search for low prices) while increasing demand for expen-
sive health care.11 Also, the elderly face substantial financial risk from health care
expenditures (McGarry and Shoeni, 2005; Goldman and Zissimopoulos, 2003;
French and Jones, 2004).
Currently, Medicare requires a 20 percent copayment and a one-day deduct-
ible for hospital stays. Most retirees have a “Medigap” plan that covers these
out-of-pocket liabilities, while Medicaid picks up the difference for those with
low-incomes who are eligible. But the percentage of private-sector employers
offering retiree health benefits has eroded, from 20 percent in 1997 to just
13 percent in 2002 (Fronstin, 2005). Even academic institutions are shedding their
retiree health benefits; only 76 percent offered such benefits in 2004, and many of
those are planning to drop coverage within the next five years (Fronstin and
Yakoboski, 2005). As noted earlier, a 55-year-old couple retiring in 2016 will need
to accumulate more than $400,000 over the next decade to pay for Medigap
11 Victor Fuchs of Stanford (personal communication) maintains that the marginal utility of consump-
tion is higher, not lower, as infirmities and disabilities accumulate at older ages. He offers as examples,
taxis, first-class airplane seats, higher quality beds, household help, and other amenities.
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insurance (Fronstin, 2006), and this sum does not include protection from nursing
home expenditure risk.
To capture the distribution and growth of these expenditures, out-of-pocket
medical expenditures for households age 75–84 were estimated from 1993 and
2004 in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS); these are shown in Figure 4. In
1993, 2 percent of households experienced out-of-pocket expenses in excess of
50 percent of their before-tax income. (This probably understates the true distri-
bution because the initial sample comprised noninstitutionalized households.) By
2004, this fraction had risen to 6 percent, with an additional 9 percent paying
between 25–50 percent of income. These estimates do not reflect unpaid bills
written off by hospitals, or patients who fail to comply with their prescription drug
regimens or clinic appointments because of difficulty in paying.
The future course of out-of-pocket expenditures is more worrisome. Figure 4
shows projected medical expenditures in 2019 based on 1993–2004 real annual
growth rates in income (1.2 percent) and a modest 4 percent annual real growth
in out-of-pocket expenditures.12 The fraction of households spending more than
one-half of their income in out-of-pocket expenditures is projected to rise to
9 percent. In another study, median out-of-pocket health care expenditures for
retiree couples were predicted to rise from $5,760 in 2000 to $16,400 in 2030,
or 35 percent of their future after-tax income (Johnson and Penner, 2004).
Past trends may not predict the future. The Medicare drug benefits are likely
to reduce the burden of out-of-pocket medical expenditures; but the continued loss
in retiree health benefits, and the hike in Part B (physician) premiums for high-
income households (Foster and Clemens, 2006), will exacerbate it. Certainly, the
prospect of an uninsured (but tax-deductible) five-year nursing home stay for the
widow of our hypothetical household in Table 2 leads to a hike of more than
$600,000 in target wealth at retirement, as shown by comparing row 12 with row 8,
albeit one that can in part can be cushioned by saving more (row 13).
Rising health care costs in the presence of a Medicaid “safety net” could have
quite heterogeneous effects on people currently working. Some might respond to
future health care costs by increasing retirement saving rates in anticipation of
higher out-of-pocket health care expenses. But others would prefer not to save
against these future contingencies and rely instead on government social insurance
programs, particularly those such as Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) that are only available to people with low wealth (Hubbard, Skinner, and
Zeldes, 1995). But Medicaid and SSI are not in themselves the most appealing of
options. For example, Medicaid restricts the dollar amount of resources one can
12 The 7.2 percent real growth in out-of-pocket expenditures estimated using the Health and Retirement
Survey data is probably too high given the downward bias in 1993 expenditures. The 4 percent estimate
comes from the real per capita growth in out-of-pocket health expenditures (including insurance
premiums) between 1980 and 2005 from Catlin, Cowan, Heffler, Washington, and the National Health
Expenditure Accounts Team (2007).
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leave to a spouse and does not pay for a number of medical services for chronic
illness, such as wheelchair or stair lifts, safety devices, and nursing aides.13 Medicaid
also limits the choice of nursing homes, because Medicaid rates are below private
pay rates.14 As Arrowood (2005) notes: “Think long and hard about counting on
Medicaid for [long-term care]. You might not get what you had expected.”
Conclusions
The question of how much one should be saving for retirement touches on many
issues in economics, psychology, and health. While there is much that we don’t know,
and much that may be unknowable, the literature does offer several lessons. First,
greater accuracy in calculating required saving rates or assets can only be a good thing,
even if it means wrestling with child equivalence scales, retirement dates, household
13 For an example of adaptive equipment not allowed by the Wisconsin Medicaid program, see
http://dhfs.wisconsin.gov/medicaid/updates/2004/2004-75att.htm, accessed May 22, 2006.
14 “While many nursing-home residents rely on Medicaid, you’ll most likely have a much easier time
finding an available bed in the nursing home of your choice if your loved one can at least pay for the
first six months or year out-of-pocket.” In “Nursing Homes Don’t Come Cheap” (FOXNews.com, 2005).
Figure 4
Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditures as a Percentage of Before-Tax Household




















Note: N  1,728 (1993) and N  1,954 (2004 and predicted 2015). All dollar amounts adjusted by the GDP
deflator and estimated using population weights. Observations excluded if household income is less than
$5,000 in 2004 dollars. The 2004 measure asked about the past two years of spending, so one-half the
reported amount is presented. For the prediction, a real growth rate of 1.2 percent for income and 4.0
percent for out-of-pocket expenditures are assumed.
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structure, future interest rates, and other values. In using ESPlanner, I was struck by
how many factors—far more than just the standard economic variables—had enor-
mous effects on target wealth. Even a simple spreadsheet program can engender that
critical wake-up call to think more about planning for retirement.
But the best laid plans can be undone by a messy divorce, a disabling disease,
or a stock market crash. In theory, one could use dynamic programming models in
a world of risk to solve for the optimal saving plan, but doing so would simply drive
home the point that it’s never possible to be entirely prepared for retirement. One
wants to avoid that sense of futility and avoidance expressed in a 1997 New Yorker
cartoon by Roz Chaz: “Who can plan, like, next week? Because an asteroid could
smash into the Earth tomorrow, so what’s the point?”
Second, planning to smooth household expenditures through retirement is a
reasonable target, particularly given that wealth requirements for Baby Boomers
may be substantially greater than those of their parents. As noted above, saving
incrementally more each year is a good strategy, because it both raises wealth
accumulation, and makes it easier to sustain consumption in the future. Substantial
evidence exists that saving programs run through employers—like IRA and 401k
accounts—can be redesigned in a number of ways to encourage greater participa-
tion and wise portfolio choices (Benartzi and Thaler, this issue).
Third, planning for consumption smoothing doesn’t mean one has to main-
tain consumption spending through retirement. One could plan on getting by with
less just after retirement (as in Aguiar and Hurst, 2006a), while leaving some assets
untouched for future contingencies. Housing wealth is ideal for this type of risk,
since equity in the house can be directly transferred to purchase an apartment in
an assisted living development, or to help pay nursing home bills. These consider-
ations may explain why households might sensibly hold on to their housing wealth
longer than is predicted under standard life-cycle models (Sun, Triest, and Webb,
2006). A more modest goal is to keep enough assets to install a walk-in shower or
wheelchair-accessible ramps, but to rely on the government for extended long-term
care.
One also wants to guard against obsessive oversaving—scrimping for years only
to die before enjoying it—and the difficult part of retirement planning is in finding
that balance. Nor will the balance be the same for every household; retirement
planning should mirror individual psychological preferences or even biological
differences in brain functioning reflecting tradeoffs between the thrill of shopping
today and the impulse to save for the future (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, and
Cohen, 2004; Knutson, Rick, Wimmer, Prelec, and Loewenstein, 2007).
Fourth, retirement planning is complex and uncertain even in the absence of
fundamental changes in public policy. Short of asteroids, there are likely to be
major changes in Social Security and health care insurance during the next few
decades (Fuchs and Emanuel, 2005). A movement towards universal health insur-
ance coverage could lead us closer to the system of care in the United Kingdom,
where the ability to pay for private health care allows patients to jump the queues
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and get their hip replacements sooner (Aaron and Schwartz, 2005). Thus, private
wealth may become even more valuable should health care reform provide univer-
sal basic coverage without the extras.
Finally, the best hope for future retirement prospects lies in strong and
equitable macroeconomic income growth, coupled with moderation in health
expenditures and a favorable fiscal balance to fund Social Security and Medicare
obligations. Of course, even with these favorable trends, a healthy 401(k) plan
won’t ensure a happy retirement, but it’s certainly a good place to start.
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